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ARTICLE 
THE FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
A "WIN-WIN-WIN" FOR TRADE, 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
ALICE L. MATTICE" 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2001, trade ministers from more than 140 
countries met at the Fourth Ministerial meeting of the World 
Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") in Doha, Qatar to es-
tablish an ambitious agenda for new global trade talks. Among 
the decisions made in Doha was a commitment to begin nego-
tiations that "aim to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of this 
sector to developing countries."1 The negotiations represent a 
" The author has been active in the area of environmental law and policy issues 
since 1989, serving as a Senior Attorney in the Environment and Natural Resources 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and most recently as Director for Trade and 
Environment Policy Planning at the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be 
attributed to USTR. 
1 WTIMIN(01)IDEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001) (Ministerial Declaration, adopted on Nov. 
14, 2001) {Doha Declaration), para. 28. While the negotiations on fisheries subsidies 
are taking place in the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules (the WTO negotiating group 
addressing the negotiating mandate for clarifying and improving disciplines under the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) more 
generally), the Doha Declaration expressly acknowledges the link to the WTO's work 
573 
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considerable milestone for the WTO. The preamble to the Mar-
rakesh Agreement establishing the WTO states that its goals 
include "the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance 
with the principles of sustainable development, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so. m By launching a trade negotiation based 
on concerns for environmental conservation and sustainable 
development -- not merely traditional trade concerns -- the 
WTO took a concrete step toward realizing that goal. 
The United States has long been a strong advocate ofWTO 
action on harmful fisheries subsidies, and a successful outcome 
of those negotiations is a key element in the United States' 
trade and environment agenda. Subsidies that contribute to 
overfishing and overcapacity not only distort trade; they also 
contribute to depletion of the world's fisheries resources and 
make it more difficult for developing countries to develop their 
own fisheries resources to feed their people: As U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert B. Zoellick has stated, "[b]y improving 
WTO disciplines on harmful fisheries subsidies, we can give a 
concrete, real world demonstration that trade liberalization 
benefits the environment and contributes to sustainable devel-
opment."· Significantly, environmental non-governmental or-
ganizations such as the World Wildlife Fund (hereinafter 
''WWF") have identified work on improving subsidy disciplines 
as a high priority and pressed for the WTO to address the is-
sue.5 
To achieve a successful outcome in the negotiations, the 
United States is working closely with a broad coalition of de-
on trade and environment. Doha Declaration, paras. 28, 31. All WTO documents cited 
in this article are available on the WTO website, at www.wto.org. 
2 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, at para. 1. 
3 The potential relevance of the WTO negotiations for developing countries was 
further underscored at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannes-
burg, South Africa, where world leaders called for action on a number of fronts to 
maintain or restore world fish stocks to sustainable levels, including the elimination of 
harmful subsidies. World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Implementa-
tion, para. 31(0 (included in REPORT OF THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. NCONF. 199/20 at 24). 
4 See USTR press release, "V.S. Submits Ideas in WTO to Reform Harmful 
Fisheries Subsidies" (Mar. 19, 2003), available at www.ustr.gov. (last visited March 
10,2004). 
5 Fisheries subsidies are an important focus of WWF's Endangered Seas Cam-
paign. See www.panda.orglendangeredseasl (last visited February 8, 2004). 
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veloped and developing countries, including Australia, Argen-
tina, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, and the Phil-
ippines. Most recently, the European Communities has 
weighed in on the side of improving disciplines, drawing in 
large part on its difficult experience in reforming its Common 
Fisheries Policy.6 China, too, has played an active role, gener-
ally supporting the proponents' efforts.7 It should be noted, 
however, that several key WTO Members - notably Japan and 
Korea - continue to question the link between subsidies and 
environmental harm and argue that the problems of the fisher-
ies sector are better addressed in other fora.s 
This paper provides a brief overview of the fisheries subsi-
dies issue and its history in the WTO. It then reviews the key 
elements of the United States' position in the WTO negotia-
tions and identifies some of the principal issues WTO Members 
will have to address in considering improved disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies. 
I. THE SUBSIDIES PROBLEM AND WHY THE WTO IS 
ADDRESSING IT:"TOO MANY BOATS CHASING TOO FEW FISH" 
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(hereinafter "FAO"), over twenty-five percent of the world's 
fisheries are overexploited and depleted, and other fisheries are 
likely to suffer similar declines if present trends continue." 
Overcapacity and overfishing have many causes (prominently 
including ineffective fisheries management regimes in many 
cases), and a multifaceted approach is clearly needed. The 
United States is actively addressing the fisheries management 
aspects of the problem in a number of fora, including the F AO 
and international and regional fisheries management organiza-
tions. 
For some time, however, there has been broad consensus 
that high levels of government subsidization to the fisheries 
6 TNIRUWl82 (European Communities) (Apr. 23, 2003). 
7 See TNlRUW188 (China) (May 1, 2003). 
S See TNlRUW/52 (Japan) (Feb. 6, 2003), TNIRLlW/69 (Korea) (Mar. 18, 2003). 
"FAO, Part 1 of the State of the World's Fisheries and Aquaculture (2000) 
available at www.fao.orglsoflsofialindex_en.htm (last visited February 8,2004); see also 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), FISHERIES MARKET 
LIBERALIZATION STUDY, PART 1, AGRlFI/(2002)8IPARTI (September 12, 2002) at 16, 
para. 16 (on file with the author). 
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sector playa significant role - at the very least, in exacerbating 
management failures and in making solutions more difficult. 
While obtaining precise data concerning subsidy levels pre-
sents numerous challenges - in part because of lack of trans-
parency in subsidy regimes, in part because of definitional un-
certainties and other technical complexities - the general scale 
of subsidization is reasonably clear. Global levels of subsidies 
are conservatively estimated at between ten and fifteen billion 
dollars annually.1O Since the total value of world capture (wild) 
fishery harvests have fluctuated between seventy and eighty 
billion dollars from 1993 to 1999, it is reasonable to conclude 
that these global levels of subsidies constitute between fifteen 
and twenty percent of aggregate dock-side revenues." 
The United States believes that subsidies at these high 
levels operate to reduce fixed and variable costs, enhance reve-
nues and mitigate risks. They therefore encourage even more 
added effort and investments in overfished and depleted fisher-
ies, which tend to predominate in the developed world. Fur-
ther, once a fishery is overfished, subsidized vessels turn to 
previously unexploited or uneconomic fisheries or go further 
offshore, often to the fishing grounds of developing countries. 
Overfishing on the part of subsidized distant water fleets thus 
makes it more difficult for developing countries - already 
strapped for resources -- to develop their own fisheries. 12 
Shortly after the founding of the WTO in 1994, the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment (hereinafter "CTE") - a 
10 The United States has used this estimate in framing the issues in the WTO. 
See TNIRLlW/21 (United States) (Oct. 15, 2002) at 3, paras. 7-9 and sources cited 
therein. This informational paper, submitted by the United States in the first phase of 
the Doha negotiations, provides a brief review of the most frequently cited efforts by 
intergovernmental bodies to estimate global levels of subsidization (see citations in note 
15, infra). See also WT/CTElW/167 (Note by the Secretariat) (Oct. 16, 2000); R. Steen-
blik and P. Wallis, "Subsidies to Marine Capture Fisheries: the International Informa-
tion Gap," in FISHING IN THE DARK: A SYMPOSIUM ON ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN FISHING SUBSIDY PROGRAMMES 
(World Wildlife Fund, 2001) (available on file with the author, amattice@ustr.gov.) at 
30 (concluding that a very rough estimate of subsidies to the fishing industry is around 
$15 billion a year, based on a combination of estimates from the OECD and APEC 
studies); World Wildlife Fund Technical Paper, HARD FACTS, HIDDEN PROBLEMS: A 
REVIEW OF CURRENT DATA ON FISHING SUBSIDIES (Oct. 2001) (on file with the author); D. 
Pauly, et al., "Towards sustainability in world fisheries," NATURE, No. 418, 689-695 
(Aug. 8,2002) (on file with the author). 
II TNIRUW/21 at 3. para. 9. 
12 [d. at para. 10. 
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non-negotiating body created to explore the environmental im-
plications of trade - began discussions on the role subsidies 
play in the fisheries sector.13 During the same period, the FAO 
began to give considerable attention to the role of subsidies. 
The F AO International Plan of Action (hereinafter "IPOA") 
(1999) adopted an International Plan of Action on the Man-
agement of Fishing Capacity, which called upon FAD members 
to reduce and progressively eliminate subsidies that contribute 
to overcapacity.l4 Studies by other intergovernmental organiza-
tions, including the World Bank, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development and the Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (hereinafter "APEC") forum, attempted to 
estimate the levels of subsidies worldwide.'5 The United Na-
tions Environmental Programme (hereinafter "UNEP") also 
began work on the environmental aspects of fisheries subsi-
dies. 16 
As more attention was focused on subsidies, advocates of 
reform - including environmental groups such as WWF -- be-
gan to focus increasingly on action in the WTO as an important 
part of an overall solution. 17 The WTO is the intergovernmen-
tal institution with the expertise in subsidies as they affect the 
world trading system. Moreover, while outcomes in other or-
13 The United States contributed actively to these discussions, including through 
a 1997 analytical paper that explored the environment and trade benefits of removing 
subsidies in the fisheries sector. WT/CTE/W/51 (United States) (May 19, 1997). See 
also WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Note by the Secretariat, 
WT/CTE/W/80 (Mar. 9, 1998). 
14 FAO IPOA on the Management of Fishing Capacity, at para. 21, available at 
http://www.oceanlaw.netltextslfaocapacity.htm (last visited January 31, 2004). 
15 See M. Milazzo, Subsidies in World Fisheries: a Reexamination, WORLD BANK 
TECHNICAL PAPER NO: 406: FISHERIES SERIES (Washington, 1998); APEC, STUDY INTO 
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SUBSIDIES IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR IN APEC MEMBER 
ECONOMIES (2000); OECD, TRANSITION TO RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES (2000) and REVIEW 
OF FISHERIES IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES (2000) (on file with the author). 
16 In 1997, UNEP and WWF co-sponsored a workshop on "The Role of Trade 
Policies in the Fishing Sector," and a UNEP consultant contributed to the analytical 
framework for consideration of fisheries subsidies. See G. Porter, "Fishing Subsidies: 
Overfishing and Trade," ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE SERIES NO. 16 (UNEP, 1998) (on file 
with the author). Most recently, UNEP's Economics and Trade Program has conducted 
several useful case studies of the role of subsidies in the fisheries sector in Argentina 
and Senegal, including the role of subsidies UNEP, FISHERIES SUBSIDIES AND MARINE 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM STUDIES IN ARGENTINA AND SENEGAL 
in FISHERIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT(2002) (on file with the author). 
17 For the WWF perspective, see D. Schorr, "Towards Rational Disciplines on 
Subsidies to the Fishery Sector" (WWF, 1998), available at www.worldwild-
life.org/commerce/discipline.pdf (last visited February 8, 2004). 
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ganizations are voluntary (such as the F AO International 
Plans of Action), WTO rules on subsidies are binding and po-
tentially enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem. 
For these reasons, including fisheries subsidies in a new 
round of WTO negotiations became a key objective of the 
United States and other like-minded WTO Members. These 
Members - known colloquially as the "Friends of Fish" -- began 
to work together informally as the WTO Third Ministerial 
meeting at Seattle in 1999 approached. At the WTO High 
Level Symposium on Trade and Environment (March 15-16, 
1999), the United States sought trade and environment "win-
wins:" areas in which trade liberalization held particular prom-
ise for yielding environmental benefits.'8 As the United States 
emphasized, "[t]his is an important way that the WTO can, 
within its mandate, be part of the solution to the world's press-
ing environmental problems - helping to level up environ-
mental protection. "'9 The United States identified fisheries sub-
sidies as one of three such "win-wins" and called for the WTO 
to "move from talk to action. rna Prior to the Seattle meeting, the 
United States joined with other "Friends of Fish" in proposing 
that as part of a new WTO round "Members agree to eliminate 
subsidies that contribute to fisheries overcapacity, in view of 
the fact that they distort trade, seriously undermine sustain-
able utilization of fish stocks and hamper sustainable develop-
ment:' 
When WTO Members were unable to launch a new round 
of negotiations in 1999, work on the issue continued in the 
CTE. The United States and other like-minded countries con-
tinued to press for WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies as a 
key part of the trade and environment agenda. Other countries, 
such as Japan and Korea, retained doubts that the WTO was 
the proper forum to address fisheries issues; rather, they ar-
gued that the issues should be addressed in the context of im-
'8 Statement of the United States: Synergies between Trade Liberalization and 
Sustainable Development (March 15, 1999) (on file with the author). 
'9 [d. at l. 
20 [d. at 3. The other two potential "win-wins" were environmental goods and 
services and the elimination of agricultural export subsidies. [d. 
2' WT/GCIW1303 (Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines 
and the United States) (August 6, 1999) at 1, para. 2. 
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proving fisheries management regimes (for example, through 
work in the FAO). These countries also questioned whether 
fisheries subsidies presented problems that were sufficiently 
unique to justify consideration in a distinct negotiation." 
In July 2000, the United States presented a paper in the 
CTE that reviewed in some detail the international debate on 
the environmental and trade implications of fisheries subsi-
dies.23 The United States sought to identify the general types of 
subsidy programs that could have harmful effects on the envi-
ronment and cause trade distortions, i.e., those that reduced 
fixed and variable costs and/or supported incomes and prices, 
and to distinguish programs that did not have such harmful 
effects, e.g., those that facilitated the transition to sustainable 
fisheries!· In response to Japan and Korea, the United States 
observed that while the degree of environmental harms caused 
by subsidies could depend upon the management regime, the 
large majority of environmentally-harmful subsidies were 
given to fleets that operated under less than perfect manage-
ment, and thus had undesirable implications to one degree or 
another for resource conservation.25 
A. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE WTO SCM 
AGREEMENT 
The subsequent successful inclusion of fisheries subsidies 
in the Doha negotiation thus followed years of extensive debate 
in the CTE. Before turning to a discussion of the United 
States' specific contributions to date, it may be useful to pro-
vide a brief overview of the current framework for addressing 
subsidies under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Meas-
ures ("SCM") Agreement. Article 1 of the SCM Agreement de-
2000). 
" See WT/GCfW/221 (Japan) (June 28, 1999); WT/CTElW/173 (Japan) (Oct. 23, 
23 WT/CTElW/154 (United States) (July 3, 2000). 
2. Id. at 3-5. 
25 Id. at 2. The United States distinguished between open access fisheries (those 
with no effective controls on inputs - e.g., on the number of fishers, the type of gear 
used, and so on, nor on outputs (the size of the catch) or on participation); regulated 
open access fisheries (limits on inputs and/or outputs, and possibly some restrictions on 
participation), and rights-based fisheries (those that have limits on the outputs for the 
fishery and specified harvest rights for individual participants or well-defined commu-
nities). Id. at note 1. 
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fines a subsidy as a "financial contribution" provided by gov-
ernments in the form of: 
• Direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, equity infu-
sions); 
• Potential transfer of funds (e.g., loan guarantees); 
• Forgone government revenues (e.g., fiscal incentives such 
as tax credits); 
• Provision of goods or services (other than general infra-
structure); 
• Payments to a funding mechanism or to a private body to 
perform any of the above; or 
• Price or import support programs (other than tariffs).26 
The subsidy must also confer an economic "benefit" on the 
recipient.27 
Once a subsidy falls within the scope of the SCM Agree-
ment, it can be classified as "prohibited" or "actionable.'''' (A 
third category of "non-actionable" subsidies, including limited 
provision for non-actionable "environmental" subsidies, expired 
in 1999 when WTO Members failed to extend it).29 Different 
sets of rules and remedies apply to each category. Further, to 
be "actionable," a subsidy must meet a "specificity" test, as set 
forth in Article 2: the subsidy must be "specific to an enter-
prise or industry or group of enterprises or industries" (as op-
posed to being broadly distributed in a country).30 
The category of "prohibited" subsidies are those presumed 
to cause trade distortions. This category is currently quite lim-
ited (i.e., to those subsidies conditioned on export, or those con-
tingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods), and a 
WTO Member may neither "grant nor maintain" them.31 In con-
26 WTO SCM Agreement, Article 1.l(a)(1)-(2). 
'J:I [d., Part I (General Provisions), Article 1.l(b). 
28 [d., Part II, Articles 3-4 (Prohibited Subsidies); Part III, Articles 5-7 (Action-
able Subsidies). 
29 [d., Part IV (Non-Actionable Subsidies), Articles 8-9 (expired pursuant to Arti-
cle 31 (Provisional Application). The expired provisions making certain "environ-
mental" subsidies non-actionable was limited to assistance to promote adaptation of 
existing facilities to "new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regula-
tions" (e.g., concerning pollution control), subject to specified conditions. See Article 
8.2(c). 
30 [d. at Articles 1.2, 2. 
31 [d. at Articles 3.l(a)-(b), 3.2. A "prohibited" subsidy under Article 3 is 
"deemed" to be "specific" under Article 2. [d., Article 2.3. 
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trast, "actionable" subsidies are not directly prohibited; they 
may, however, be challenged by WTO members under national 
countervailing duty laws (subject to provisions of the SCM 
Agreement) or through WTO dispute settlement procedures 
upon a demonstration of "adverse effects:" "injury" to a domes-
tic industry," "nullification or impairments" of its benefits un-
der the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, or "seri-
ous prejudice.',"2 These terms are defined in detail through 
other provisions. For example, "serious prejudice" arises when 
certain harms are demonstrated (e.g., loss of market share, 
price undercutting).33 
The above framework is often referred to in WTO parlance 
as the "traffic light" system, with prohibited subsidies consid-
ered "red light," actionable subsidies "yellow light," and (the 
now expired) non-actionable subsides "green light." To add to 
the imagery, another now expired provision within the category 
of actionable subsidies (Article 6.1) created a "dark amber" 
category: i.e., subsidies that fell into four specific categories 
were presumed to cause "serious prejudice."34 The effect of the 
"dark amber" provision was to shift the burden of proof to the 
subsidizing government. That is, instead of the complaining 
government's having to prove harm, the subsidizing govern-
ment must prove that the subsidy did not cause one of the 
enumerated harms to trade.3s 
Significantly, the "dark amber" and "green" categories 
were linked together, as they both applied for five years and 
needed a consensus of WTO Members to be extended, pursuant 
to Article 31 (which did not occur).36 The linkage suggests that 
if WTO Members consider reviving a "green" of non-actionable 
subsidies in the current negotiations, it should be balanced by 
a "dark amber" category of strengthened disciplines. 
Another provision relevant to the fisheries negotiations is 
Article 25, which requires WTO Members to provide notifica-
32 [d. at Article 5. 
33 See id. at Article 6.3; the definition of "injury" in Article 15 is similar. 
34 The four categories were: (i) a total ad valorem subsidization of a product 
exceeding 5 per cent; (ii) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; 
(ii) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise (other than one-time 
measures meeting certain conditions) and (iv) direct forgiveness of debt. [d. at Article 
6.1 (a)-(d). 
35 [d. at Article 6.2. 
36 [d. at Article 31. 
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tions of their subsidies falling within Article 1 to the WTO 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and al-
lows Members to make written requests to other Members for 
information about such subsidies.37 Many observers have noted 
that the notification system, to date, has generally not been 
effective in obtaining transparency and reliable data on fisher-
ies subsidies.38 
B. THE UNITED STATES' CONTRIBUTION TO THE DOHA 
NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE 
Consistent with the approach in other negotiating groups, 
the work on fisheries subsidies in the WTO Negotiating Group 
on Rules in the first phase of the Doha negotiations has con-
sisted of efforts to identify issues that WTO Members will need 
to address in clarifying and improving disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies, including identifying the gaps in the current WTO 
rules. As part of this first phase, eight of the leading propo-
nents of the negotiations, including the United States, submit-
ted a paper in April 2002 that sought to identify in broad out-
line the reasons why the existing SCM Agreement had not been 
effective in disciplining fisheries subsidies.39 
As the paper explained, the existing SCM rules (e.g., Arti-
cle 6.2, Article 16) are designed to address certain types of 
market distortions associated with subsidized products (such 
as effects on price and market share in competing markets). A 
distinctive feature of fisheries subsidies, however, are such 
subsidies operate to limit non-subsidized participants' access to 
shared fisheries resources. That is, subsidies enable subsidized 
producers to increase their catches to levels beyond those that 
would otherwise be the case, with the result that non-
subsidized producers are limited to lower levels - and in ex-
treme cases there may be no fish to catch because the stock has 
been depleted. It may, however, be difficult in the fisheries 
context to determine which industries have been affected and 
by how much: i.e., "[ilf subdi[zled fishers deplete a shared 
37 Id. at Part VII (Notification and Surveillance), Article 25. 
38 See WWF, FISHING IN THE DARK and HARD FACTS, HIDDEN PROBLEMS (cited 
supra. note 11). 
39 TN/RUW/3 (Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, Philip-
pines, and the United States) (Apr. 24, 2002). 
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stock, all other fishers lose access to that stock, not merely 
those competing alongside the subsidi[z]ed product at mar-
ket. "40 Thus, it may also be difficult to demonstrate price effects 
and loss of market share in a particular market in the manner 
contemplated by the current rules. The paper also noted the 
"poor quality of fisheries notifications under the SCM Agree-
ment, and the inaccessibility of information on government 
program[s] in the fisheries sector.'''! 
In this first phase, however, those Members less enthusi-
astic about the fisheries negotiations -(principally Japan and 
Korea) continued to deny that there was a significant linkage 
between fisheries subsidies and harmful trade and conserva-
tion effects. These Members appeared to question the Doha 
mandate itself, arguing both that fisheries subsidies should be 
subsumed in the broader negotiations on subsidies generally 
and that the environmental aspects of the problem should be 
relegated to the regular (non-negotiating) sessions of the CTE.'2 
In October 2002, the United States contributed an informa-
tional paper intended to help meet these objections by review-
ing the substantial work done in other fora concerning the ad-
verse trade and conservation effects of fisheries subsidies.'3 
Japan and Korea remained unconvinced. 
However, the ministers at Doha - and later world leaders 
at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment - had already made clear that the nature of the fisheries 
subsidy problem required a WTO contribution. It thus became 
increasingly important to move the discussion forward toward 
initiating a constructive debate on possible solutions. Accord-
ingly, the United States submitted a significant paper in March 
2003 (introduced by United States Ambassador to the WTO 
Linnet Deily)." 
The United States suggested that the most useful starting 
point for such a dialogue would be to consider an adaptation of 
the existing so-called "traffic light" system in the SCM Agree-
ment. The U.S. paper specifically proposed consideration of: 
40 
Id. at 3-4 (paras. 9-16); see also TN/RLIW/12 (New Zealand) (July 4,2002). 
4! Id. at 3 (para. 8). 
42 S ee, e.g" TNIRUW/69 (Korea) (March 18, 2003); TN/RLIW/17 (Korea) (Oct. 2, 
2002); TN/RLIW/52 (Japan) (Feb. 6, 2003); TN/RLIW/ll (Japan) (July 2, 2002). 
43 TNIRIlW/21 (cited in note 11, supra). 
" TNIRIlW177 (United States) (Mar. 19, 2003). 
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• A possible expansion of the "red light" category of the 
subsidies prohibited under the WTO rules to include fisheries 
subsidies that directly promote overcapacity and overfishing, or 
have other direct-trade distorting effects (see SCM Agreement, 
Article 3). 
• Creation of a "dark amber" category of fisheries subsidies 
that could either supplement or be independent of the red light 
approach. That is, subsidies in this category could be presumed 
to be harmful unless the subsidizing government could affirma-
tively demonstrate that no overcapacity/overfishing or other 
adverse trade effects have resulted from the subsidies. If the 
presumption were not rebutted, the subsidy would be action-
able and thus subject to challenge. The "dark amber" category 
could be modeled on the now expired Article 6.1 of the SCM 
Agreement (see discussion, supra). 
• Improvements to the quality of fisheries subsidy notifica-
tions under WTO rules (see Article 25 of the SCM Agreement). 
Such improvements could include provision for more detailed 
fishery-specific information, including information about rele-
vant management regimes, in order to make notifications of 
fisheries subsidies under the SCM Agreement more comple-
mentary of existing fishery-related information (e.g., on capac-
ity) submitted in other fora. 
• Seeking ways to draw upon the relevant expertise in 
other international organizations (such as the F AO) and obtain 
the views of non-governmental groups, including the fisheries 
industry and environmental conservation groupS:5 
The United States also made clear that the target of the 
negotiations should be harmful subsidies, i.e., those that pro-
mote overcapacity and overfishing. The paper acknowledged 
that other government programs may help to reduce overcapac-
ity and overfishing and contribute to fisheries sustainability, 
and that these latter programs should not be the focus of im-
proved disciplines:· 
Following the United States' paper, other Members came 
forward with their own suggestions on ways to move forward in 
the fisheries subsidy negotiations prior to the September 2003 
WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico. Significantly, in 
45 [d. at 2-3. paras. 5-8. 
46 [d. at 1, note 1. 
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April 2003, the European Communities weighed in on the fish-
eries subsidies issue for the first time by presenting a submis-
sion that proposed a prohibition on "capacity enhancing" subsi-
dies and, in addition, a category of "permitted" subsidies (pre-
sumably non-actionable or "green light").47 The EC further sug-
gested that the WTO Secretariat should keep a "scoreboard" of 
subsidy notifications received, which would be made publicly 
available:· Chile also presented a paper, suggesting "red light" 
and "amber light" categories, with a potential shift of the bur-
den to the subsidizing Member in the latter case if that Mem-
ber had not met its notification requirements:' Thus, while 
Japan and Korea remained skeptical, the fisheries subsidies 
negotiations received a renewed momentum, and there ap-
peared to be an emerging consensus (at least among propo-
nents of the negotiations) that a "traffic light" approach should 
be explored. 50 
II. CURRENT ISSUES AND STATUS 
At Cancun, WTO Members were unable to reach agree-
ment on ways to move forward in the Doha negotiations over-
all. As of the date of this article, negotiations on fisheries sub-
sidies (as in other areas) have not resumed, as Members con-
tinue taking stock of the Cancun outcome. There are indica-
tions, however, that the negotiating groups will resume meet-
ing in 2004. It should be noted that the WTO negotiations are a 
"single undertaking;" that is, results must be achieved in all 
areas of the negotiations, not merely regarding fisheries subsi-
dies, and must be applicable to all Members. 
When the fisheries subsidies negotiations resume, they are 
likely to move into a more technical phase. One issue to be ad-
dressed is how best to develop improved and clarified disci-
plines on fisheries subsidies that are clear and easily enforce-
able, yet recognize the many unique features of fisheries (in-
47 TNIRUW/82 (cited at note 7, supra) at 2-3. 
48 [d. at 4. 
4' TNIRUW/U5 (June 10, 2003). 
50 But see, e.g., TNIRUW/97 (Korea) (May 5, 2003) (suggesting that the U.S. 
version of the "traffic light" approach is premature and that discussion of environ-
mental aspects are outside the scope of the negotiations). 
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cluding the role of fisheries management schemes) and com-
plement the work of other organizations such as the F AO. It is 
important both that the WTO contribute constructively to an 
overall solution, and that it stay within the bounds of its exper-
tise. 
Another issue is how to distinguish between harmful sub-
sidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing and sub-
sidies that do not have such harmful effects. As indicated 
above, the United States recognizes that many government 
fisheries programs have positive rather than negative effects 
on fisheries resources. Atthe same time, an open-ended "green 
light" category could offer many opportunities for abuse. For 
that reason, the United States has suggested determining the 
scope of improved disciplines before considering whether care-
fully targeted exceptions are needed. 
Finally, as instructed in the Doha Declaration, WTO 
Members will need to "tak[e] into account the importance of the 
[fisheries] sector to developing countries. "51 As the negotiations 
proceed, Members should be prepared to discuss how improve-
ments in fisheries disciplines might apply to developing coun-
tries. 
Although these issues will likely prove difficult, the nego-
tiations offer the United States and other WTO Members an 
historic opportunity to help improve the state of the world's 
fisheries - and to demonstrate, more broadly, that trade liber-
alization and environmental protection can and should be com-
plementary goals. For these reasons, the fisheries subsidies 
negotiations are likely to remain a significant part of the 
United States' trade and environment agenda. 
51 Doha Declaration at para. 28. 
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